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Introduction 
The Mongol period in Russian history, between roughly 1240 and 1480, is colloquially 
known as the “Tatar Yoke” because of the ethnicity of the conquerors. During this period of 
conquest, medieval Russia was at the crossroads of two vast, irreconcilable worlds. From the 
west Russia lay at the rim of Eastern Christendom, and from the east, Russia was the 
westernmost domain of the Mongol dominions stretching from the China Sea to just a few 
hundred miles outside present-day Vienna, Austria. Charles Halperin, a contemporary Russian 
historian, has argued “it is part of this conundrum of medieval Russia that is was part and yet 
not a part of both realms.”5 For three centuries the Mongols were an essential part of Russian 
existence and the Russian people became intimately familiar with them. The question remains: 
to what extent was their relationship symbiotic.  
It is difficult to come to definitive conclusions about these Russo-Tatar relations. Almost 
all historians agree violence was widespread, but we do not know how many towns were 
destroyed or how many people were put to the sword. To what extent did agriculture suffer? 
How was trade affected? In what ways was Russian culture subsequently influenced? The 
existing scholarship for this period paints different pictures of the Mongols and their impacts on 
the Rus’. This picture is partly distorted because many historians do not give adequate 
attention to the bookmen who described the centuries-long contacts between Russians and 
Mongols. These early Russian writers, chroniclers, ideologues were members of the Orthodox 
Church and because they were writing from the perspective of Christianity, many of their 
                                                          
5 Charles Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 126.  
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observations have been discounted. Earlier interpretations from the eighteen and nineteenth 
centuries were strongly influenced by national and cultural prejudice against the notion that 
the civilized, Christian Russians could have been influenced, except negatively, by uncivilized, 
barbarian, pagan and later Muslims Tatars.6 Other historians have regarded Kievan Rus’ as a 
lost golden age and have held the “devastating Mongol invasion of the mid-thirteenth century 
responsible both for demolishing Kievan civilization and for retarding Russia’s progress vis a vis 
the rest of Europe.”7 In the early twentieth century, Eurasian historians such as George 
Vernadsky began to view the Russian state as a blend of both influences from the East and 
West. This camp saw Russia as much Asian as European, if not more.   
More recently historians such as Charles Halperin, Donald Ostrowski, and Leo de Hartog 
have all shed light on a more accurate picture of the Mongol impact, highlighting its complexity. 
These three historians and their works on the Mongol yoke and Muscovy were instrumental to 
this project. Halperin, a contemporary American historian, specializes in Russian history and his 
Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (1985) and The 
Tatar Yoke (2009) have been especially key to understanding the bookmen’s motives in 
completing this project. Furthermore, he is credited with developing the “ideology of silence” 
discussed in the proceeding pages. Another historian, Donald Ostrowski, a faculty associate at 
the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and Research Advisor for the Harvard 
University Extension School, has provided key secondary insight that propelled much of the 
latter half of this thesis. His 1998 book, Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross Cultural Influences on 
                                                          
6 Marcus Levitt, Time of Troubles: Violence in Russian Literature and Culture, University of Wisconsin Press, 2007, 
23.  
7 Levitt, Time of Troubles: Violence in Russian Literature and Culture, 4.  
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the Steppe Frontier provided crucial literature and primary sources about the growth of 
Muscovy. Lastly, Leo de Hartog is a Dutch historian and specialist on Mongol history. Hartog’s 
Russia and the Mongol Yoke, 1221-1502, provided important insight into the Mongol Empire 
and steppe peoples and traditions.  
 This project focuses on the writings and chronicles of the Russian bookmen. These 
bookmen were professional chroniclers, writers, redactors, and scribes who had before them a 
wide variety of material, a considerable part of which is no longer in existence.8 They worked to 
preserve manuscripts and ancient texts and stories about the lives of saints, political events, 
and developments year by year. These bookmen were most often monks and members of the 
Russian Orthodox Church who later became official Muscovite scribes. Though occasionally a 
bookman might include his name in his chronicle compilation, most of the bookmen and priests 
who wrote were anonymous. Historians have usually taken these anonymous Russian bookmen 
at their word and accepted the picture of the Mongols as a foreign race of barbarians. The 
bookmen praised grand princes, painted battles as brave occasions, and described the Mongols 
as pagans or infidels. Ultimately, it seems that the bookmen were not simply telling stories or 
copying words, they were applying analysis and interpretations by their selection of words. In 
this way, they were conveying a political message in religious terms as the articulators of early 
Russian ideology.  
The bookmen compiled their texts in the form of chronicles. These chronicles were 
collections of entries in which bookmen recorded battles, political succession, deaths, religious 
                                                          
8 The Nikonian Chronicle, Volume Three from the Year 1241 to 1381, vii.  
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martyrs, crop yields, consecration of churches, and other significant events. They come down to 
us not in their original form, but rather as parts of larger codices and hint at broader political 
and social conditions. Furthermore, the chronicles contain passages and tales that are not 
purely historical, and each chronicle, while it may originate from a specific town or region, 
certainly includes tales from others.  
Throughout the twelfth and fifteenth centuries, bookmen compiled and recompiled the 
chronicles, consistently adding source material. Under the initiative of certain archbishops and 
metropolitans in the Orthodox Church, rearrangements of the records would often occur. The 
rank of metropolitan pertains to a bishop who presides over a metropolis, the chief religious 
figure over a province or region. By 1310, Metropolitan Peter planned a pan-Russian 
compilation of chronicles, in which the chronicle writing of all Russia would be combined, and 
the local annals brought together.9 Other chronicles, such as The Nikonian Chronicle, include 
the lives of saints, stories about battles, and other literary works written as historical reportage.   
One of the most important chronicles for this project is The Chronicle of Novgorod, 
1016-1471, in its modern version, translated and annotated in 1970. It abounds in refences to 
church matters and records events in Novgorod as well as in Kiev and Moscow. The Novgorod 
Chronicle indicates that chronicle-writing in Novgorod began in 1110 and does, however, 
contain some insight into who compiled it. In 1144, the text indicates that Herman Voyata was 
appointed priest for 45 years.10 Voyata then passed his compilation on to another priest and 
this process of compiling and passing on continued uninterruptedly for centuries. According to 
                                                          
9 The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1470, xxxviii.  
10 The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471, xxxviii.  
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the text, The Novgorod Chronicle was formed by the compilation of “chronicles of the Church of 
St. James (in Novgorod); it was amplified both by data from the Novgorod archiepiscopal 
chronicle, by annual entries from it, and also by loans from the pan-Russian compilation” which 
began in the fourteenth century.11  
A second key chronicle for this project is the Galician-Volynian Chronicle, annotated and 
translated most recently in 1973 which recorded events from 1201 to 1292 and provided the 
most information regarding the initial Mongol invasions. It is the most poetic of the early 
chronicles and dates to the thirteenth century; it was then copied again in the fifteenth. It was 
later revised again in 1843, 1908, and 1926.12 Furthermore, the Russian Primary Chronicle 
translated and edited by Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd Sherbowitz-Wetzor from 195313 
provides the earliest tales of Kievan Rus’, including the introduction of Christianity, the 
gathering of the tribes of Rus’ people, and early princely succession.  
The Nikonian Chronicle, a sixteenth-century work that covers the history of Russia from 
the ninth century through the year 1520 was completed in the 1520s in the offices of the 
Metropolitan of all Russia, under the guidance of Metropolitan Daniel himself.  Annotated by 
Serge A. Zenkovsky, a historian at Vanderbilt University, in the 1990s, it differs sharply from the 
other chronicles. It largely appears to be a revision of the Muscovite past and includes new 
information and tales that do not appear in any other chronicles. Zenkovsky explains that this 
new information was the work of sixteenth century editors who had access to sources that 
                                                          
11 The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471, xxxix 
12 The Galician-Volynian Chronicle, 12-14. 
13 Though this source is approximately seventy years old, the translation has largely remained the same since. 
Most contemporary historians have accepted this edition.  
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contemporary historians do not.14 Zenkovsky further points out that the lack of information in 
previous chronicles was due to the oppressiveness of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. He 
mentions that those before The Nikonian Chronicle remained dry and recorded deaths, and 
“extremely short reports of political events.”15 In contrast The Nikonian Chronicle takes “the 
form of historical-literary anthology” based not only on various chronicles but also on literary 
works that contain more interesting details about the life and psyche of the Russian people 
than do materials which recorded strictly historical events.”16 By the nineteenth century, the 
Russian Academy of Sciences compiled the Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles (Polnoe 
Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei). This collection included almost all of the East Slavic chronicles with 
various editions from tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union and the Russia Federation. While the first 
edition appeared during the mid-nineteenth century, new editions were produced throughout 
the next two centuries.   
With the exception of the chronicles, the period between Kiev and Moscow was a dark 
era for literature. At a minimum, “the level of literacy on the eve of the Mongol invasion was 1 
percent of a population of 7 million, 2 percent of the adult population, and 1.3 percent of those 
aged nine years and older.” The corresponding male literacy levels “of the urban population 
were percentages of 10, 20, and 13.”17 Beginning in the eleventh century, writers began to tell 
the story of their own land. It appears that the purpose of the writing was not purely historical, 
but to connect the sacred and a vision of the land of Rus’ as a distinctive domain defined by 
                                                          
14 Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, 148.  
15 Serge A. Zenkovsky, “Introduction,” The Nikonian Chronicle, vol. 1, From the Beginning to the Year 1132, xxxvi.  
16 Serge A. Zenkovsky, “Introduction,” The Nikonian Chronicle, vol. 3, From the Year 1241 to the Year 1381, xxi.  
17 Boris N. Mironov, “The Development of Literacy in Russia and the USSR from the Tenth to the Twentieth 
Centuries.” History of Education Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 2 (Summer, 1991), 229-252, 230.  
Kessel 13 
 
Orthodox Christian practices.18 Because bookmen typically foregrounded the experience of 
religion as a matter of identity, these religiously infused texts roused antagonism against the 
invader as an “other” which heavily accented these tales. Within the land of Rus’, writing 
tended to focus on the narrative of Christianization, and heroic resistance to invasion from the 
steppe or the east. Narratives that vilified invaders tended to sanctify princes. Then, as 
Muscovy rose in the fifteenth century and incorporated other towns, national narratives 
superseded local ones.  
Apart from the chronicles, this story requires background on the arrival of Christianity, 
the central Kievan political processes, and the key actors in Kievan Rus’ prior to the Mongols. In 
988, Vladimir I, the grand prince of Novgorod and the ruler of Kievan Rus’, adopted a policy that 
helped to integrate the diverse tribes into a single society by introducing an ideology that would 
legitimize his rule: a uniform monotheistic religion. One chronicle tale tells how Vladimir I sent 
representatives to investigate all the religions across the region.19 After discovering many 
faiths, these representative envoys traveled to Constantinople. According to the Primary 
Chronicle, they were overcome with awe: “for on earth there is no such splendor or such 
beauty, and we are at a loss how to describe it. We know only that God dwells there among 
men, and their service is fairer than the ceremonies of other nations.”20 As the chronicle tale 
continues, war comes to play a major role in this adoption of Christianity. Vladimir led a 
campaign against a Byzantine outpost along the Crimean Peninsula and demanded the 
                                                          
18 Andrew Kahn, Mark Lipovetsky, Irina Reyfman, and Stephanie Sandler, A History of Russian Literature, (Oxford 
University Press), 2018, 44.  
19Janet Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 2nd edition, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7.   
20 The Russian Primary Chronicle, Laurentian Text, translated and edited By Samuel Hazzard Cross and Olgerd P. 
Sherbowitz-Wetzor (Cambridge, Mass.: Medieval Academy of America, 1953), 110-111.  
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Byzantine Emperor’s sister in marriage as he held the town ransom. Empower Basil agreed to 
his conditions, Vladimir was baptized, and the two were married. The story ends as Vladimir 
returned to the city and conducted a mass baptism of the Kievan population.21 The accepted 
date for the formal conversion of the Kievan population to Christianity became 988.22 
Vladimir’s forced adoption of Christianity had a “major impact on Kievan Rus’ because 
the Church became a second institution, along with the ruling dynasty that gave shape and 
definition to the emerging state,” according to Janet Martin, a Medieval Russian historian at the 
University of Miami. In fact, this conversion turned Kievan Rus’ away from the Muslim East, and 
aligned it with Byzantium which brought an influx of western cultural influences. In doing so, 
Martin emphasizes that this “adoption of Christianity gave Kievan Rus’ access to an array of 
ecclesiastical literature in a variety of genres” which included the original Byzantine chronicles 
which early Rus’ clerics used as models for their own compositions and the first written 
histories of Vladimir I.23 Although Christian culture penetrated and spread through Slav society 
slowly, it provided all the tribes a common cultural background, and Vladimir’s descendants 
were depicted as God’s anointed princes.24 
Into the next century, Kievan princes turned responsibilities for rooting out pagan 
customs and establishing new standards in spheres of human conduct over to the bishops.25 
Guided by religion, the Church’s early duties involved suppressing pagan priesthood, sorcerers, 
and witches; moreover, and the princes even gave the Church shared judicial responsibilities in 
                                                          
21 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 7-8.  
22 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 9.  
23 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 11.  
24 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 12.  
25 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 82.  
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local courts.26 Thus, according to Martin, “the extension of ecclesiastical influence placed 
stronger pressures on the populace to adopt Christian norms of behavior as well as to accept 
conversion formally.”27 As Kievan Rus’ grew more complex, the functions of princes and 
Orthodox Church officials broadened. Princes provided protection while the Church offered 
spiritual guidance. These institutions, the prince and the church, provided the guidelines for 
social and economic activities and utilized their power to enforce conformity to these 
standards. They had borrowed from Byzantium this unity of state and church as a socio-political 
structure.  
Thus, centuries prior to the Mongol invasion, the new faith spread slowly and by 1025, 
there were only about a dozen churches in the whole vast of the country. In the next 100 years, 
patriarchs in Constantinople appointed several bishops throughout the lands of Rus’, and the 
Russia Orthodox Church gradually adopted Byzantine canon law. In doing so, the Russian 
Church began to develop a literature of its own using Byzantine frameworks.28 
By the thirteenth century, Orthodox Christianity had become firmly established in all 
Russian cities, but then the Mongols arrived between 1237 and 1240. With these raids, the 
Mongols eventually exempted the Church from tax property. The Mongols converted to Islam 
and respected the Orthodox as “people of the Book” and therefore did not tax the monasteries. 
This tax exemption would prove to help the Church spread further because throughout Rus’, 
the chief source of income was agriculture. Monasteries which had previously been in strictly 
                                                          
26 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 84.  
27 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 85.  
28 Bernard Hamilton, The Christian World of the Middle Ages, (Sutton Publishing, 2003), 83.  
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urban areas, began to be established in rural areas because of their tax-exempt status. As a 
result, the Church had little difficulty recruiting peasants to work their lands and, in this way, 
the Orthodox Church spread deeper into rural areas.29 
While the development of Christianity in the lands of Rus’ is critical to understanding the 
Mongol period, the Kievan princes also developed a unique political system. After the 
conversion of the Kievan population, Vladimir I, dispersed his sons across Kievan Rus’. This 
move invoked the principle of shared authority and a “corollary principle of rotation among the 
princely seats by the princes” was introduced.30 The system chose the senior member of their 
generation as the inheritor of Vladimir’s throne, but the problem was deciding who the senior 
member was. Thus, Vladimir’s designating his eldest son as the senior prince, in the view of 
many scholars, began the rota or ladder system of succession, “according to which the Kievan 
throne passed laterally from one brother to another in order of their ages.”31 This system held 
that the princely seats were arranged in a hierarchy. Thus, the eldest brother ruled the most 
important town, Kiev, then Chernigov, then Pereiaslavl.32 If a vacancy opened, the next prince 
in line would then rotate into this position.  
A key event that charted the course of early political development in Russia occurred 
when Yaroslav the Wise who ruled as grand prince of Kiev, died in 1054. During his reign, 
Yaroslav oversaw the codification of legal customs and princely duties. Kievan Rus’ reached its 
military and cultural zenith, but his death would transfer power to his many sons. The confusing 
                                                          
29 Bernard Hamilton, The Christian World of the Middle Ages, (Sutton Publishing, 2003).  
30 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 25.  
31 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 30 
32 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 30.  
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rota system led to civil war that dominated the next hundred years, the political center shifted 
to the Northeast, and the Kievan conglomerate separated into smaller principalities, or princely 
states.33 Martin, describes how “each confrontation may therefore be regarded as a stage in 
the evolution of the succession system, a process and a system so critical to the political 
organization that they excited passions of war.”34 The succession struggle is key to 
understanding the evolving system of dynastic control and political authority until Muscovy’s 
consolidation of Russia.  
After the dissolution of Kievan Rus’, the region was separated into many fragmented 
princely states, each with its own leader and institutions. Each ruling prince had his own force 
of military retainers, mostly nobles, who had their own cohort of fighting men. Yet all of these 
princes and fighting men had one sovereign leader, the Grand Prince of Vladimir to whom they 
owed their allegiance and loyalty. Vladimir became the chief town of the Russian settlements as 
The Grand Prince of Vladimir, theoretically, remained the first among the princes and the 
symbolic leader of the community.35 Moscow’s grand princes would later strengthen and 
enforce these bonds of loyalty.  
 Until the twelfth century, the Mongols were one of many steppe or nomadic peoples 
best described as Turko-Mongol. Most foreigners referred to them as “Tatars,” but the Tatars 
were just one of the many tribes living in Mongolia. Yet for outsiders, the name became a 
general label for the peoples of Mongolia.36 Temuchin, later Chingiz Khan, was able to unite the 
                                                          
33 Paul Harrison Silfen, The Influence of the Mongols on Russia: a Dimensional History (Hicksville, NY: Exposition 
Press, 1974), 3-5.  
34 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 31.  
35 Crummey, The Formation of Muscovy: 1304-1613, 31.  
36 David Morgan, “Chingiz Khan and the Founding of the Mongol Empire” in The Mongols, 2007, 50.  
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nomads on the steppe in Mongolia under his rule. In the years before 1206, he brought the 
tribes of Mongolia one by one under Mongol rule by conscripting those he conquered. Thus, for 
the first time, the tribes of the Mongolian steppe lands had a supreme ruler, and a superb 
army, invincible by thirteenth-century standards.37 Some historians have argued that the 
Mongols would only remain united when fighting external enemies, because keeping the 
hordes from splitting had been a struggle for centuries. Hence, one explanation for the 
beginnings of the Mongol conquest was preserving the unity of the steppe people. The only 
matter that required a decision was in which direction the armies would advance.38 Unlike the 
Russian chronicles, the Mongols have no primary source base.  
 After quickly conquering China, the Mongols moved west onto the Rus’ lands. Until 
modern times, most Russian peasants lived in isolated settlements. They lived off the forest for 
resources and farmed to provide food. Outside of the immediate family, these peasants owed 
allegiance to a community collective of male heads of households who dealt with disputes, and 
later taxes and more administrative procedures. Besides the peasants, the other main group 
was the nobility, aside from the ecclesiastics. These nobles were warriors who made up the 
ruling prince’s retinue appointed in each principality.39 Taking into consideration the 
demographics of Rus’, this thesis argues that the Rus’ social structure was essential to both the 
Mongol’s ability to conquer and the later amalgamation of Muscovy.  
                                                          
37 David Morgan, “Chingiz Khan and the Founding of the Mongol Empire” in The Mongols, 2007, 53.  
38 David Morgan, “Chingiz Khan and the Founding of the Mongol Empire” in The Mongols, 2007, 60.  
39 Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 65-67.  
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This thesis argues that in the chronicles, bookmen propagated attitudes toward and 
about the Mongols that evolved over time due to the interconnected nature of political 
developments and the privileged status of the Church. Chapter one argues that bookmen 
explain the invasion as a result of Russian sins and use themes of suffering and martyrdom40 to 
explain the invasion. In doing so, the bookmen were providing a stricken population with 
spiritual consolation. Chapter two argues that these sentiments evolved to notions of defense 
and resistance in order to inspire the preservation of Orthodoxy, Kievan traditions such as the 
rota system, and Rus’ control of the land. Finally, chapter three articulates the bookmen’s 
theme of outright anti-Mongol ideology used to prop up the legitimacy and political authority 
of Moscow. Because religion and politics were intertwined throughout Medieval Europe, the 
attitudes toward the Mongols evolved reciprocally as the political climate changed, in tandem 
with one another.  
In response to the Mongols, bookmen developed a narrative of survival and revival and 
later advanced a post-Mongol vision of Moscow as the center of Russia. As endlessly expansive 
vehicles for all types of writing and recorded local knowledge, these chronicles tell the story of 
the rise of the Russian state as bookmen tell it as a tale of trauma and conquest with the 
potential for renewal.  
 
 
                                                          
40 I define martyrdom as dying or being killed solely because of one’s religious beliefs.  
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Chapter One 
“And how could the Mongol influence on Russian life be considerable, when the Mongols lived 
far off, did not mix with the Russians, and came to Russia only to gather tribute or as an army 
brought in the most part by Russian princes for the princes’ own purposes?... Therefore, we can 
proceed to consider the internal life of Russian society in the thirteenth century without paying 
attention to the fact of the Mongol yoke…”41 
           -Andrei Platonov, 1899 
“A convenient method of gauging the extent of Mongol influence on Russia is to compare the 
Russian state and society of the pre-Mongol period with those of the post-Mongol era, and in 
particular to contrast the spirit and institutions of Muscovite Russia with those of Russia of the 
Kievan age . . . The Picture changed completely after the Mongol period.”42 
    -George Vernadsky, 195343 
The above quotations epitomize the conflicting nature of the multitude of 
interpretations of the Mongol Empire and its effects on Russia. Many scholars have 
acknowledged the importance of the Mongols’ impact on the Rus’ lands, but its precise nature 
and extent remains very contentious. Historians disagree about the origins and development of 
Muscovy and the Russian state, but all admit the importance of outside influences as well as 
indigenous developments. Central sources for examining this period are the texts and logs from 
bookmen, chroniclers and clergy during the invasion and initial Mongol occupation. Some of 
these early accounts explain social and cultural perceptions of the invaders as well as portraits 
of the early Russian people themselves.  
                                                          
41 S.F. Platonov, Letskii po russkoi istorii, 1899 vol. 1, 85 in Nicholas V. Riasanovksy, The History of Russia (fourth 
ed.), (New York City, NY: Oxford University Press, 1984), 67. 
42 Riasanovsky, The History of Russia, 67.  
43 George Vernadsky was a Russian-born American historian and author of many books on Russian history 
throughout the twentieth century. Specially, he emphasized the importance of nomadic cultures on the 
development of Russia and its many empires. He helped pave the way for the idea that Russia was influenced as 
much by the East as the West and maybe more.  
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This chapter seeks to argue that during the initial phase of the Mongol invasion, 
bookmen wrote about the Mongols in religious terms through themes of martyrdom and 
suffering. Thus, the bookmen and the Church saw the Mongols not as rulers and kings to whom 
they owed allegiance but as infidel pagans who were invading because of Russian sins. This idea 
would become a collective attitude across the Rus’ lands as it appears in almost every chronicle 
across the region. By examining the chronicles during the initial Mongol invasion, we can 
understand how bookmen explain the invasion as a result of Russian sins to provide a stricken 
population with spiritual consolation.   
The accounts of early bookmen, mostly clerics and intellectuals, found in the Primary 
Chronicle and Chronicle of Novgorod, two collections of translated, medieval primary sources 
spanning from approximately 850-1471, reveal that Russians feared, but acquiesced to, Mongol 
rule, 1240-1480. Contemporary Russian sources portray Mongol pillaging, destruction, and 
oppression as some of the only effects; however, such prolonged contact inevitably acquainted 
Russians with Mongol administration, politics, language and society.44 While the bookmen do 
not explicitly stress these more positive effects, the Mongols also fostered international 
commerce, defended against Eastern European invaders, and provided the fiscal and 
bureaucratic models used by the later Muscovite state.45   
Any study of the Mongol influence on Russia must acknowledge some inconsistencies 
between medieval and modern scholarly views of the Mongols. Many early Western travelers, 
                                                          
44 Charles Halperin, “Russia and the Mongols,” in Wendy Kasinec and Michael Polushin’s Expanding Empires 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2002), 198.  
45 Halperin, “Russia and the Mongols,” 199.  
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as well as various Chinese aristocrats, depicted the Mongols as destructive hordes, yet modern 
scholars have argued that “Mongol and Turkic powers were far less nomadic and plundering 
than is usually claimed.”46 The Mongols possessed a well-established political structure, tax 
system, and conscription system that they passed on to their Eurasian successors. These 
Mongol institutions and their survival are crucial because they reveal that the Mongols 
controlled their empire not only through coercion and brute force, but also by imposing a well-
functioning bureaucracy. Lastly, the steppe interaction with the Mongols is important because 
even when the capital was in large urban centers such as Moscow, the steppe was the place of 
interaction between the Russians and the Mongols.47  
Another important aspect to consider in trying to understand the Mongol influence is 
the prevalence of nationalist, pro-Russian historiography. Such interpretations diminish the 
importance of the Mongols and elevate Russia as a victorious European state that conquered 
the Mongols. Nomads and sedentary groups in Central Asia had enjoyed contact with Kievan 
Rus’ for thousands of years. Historian Allessandro Stanziani has traced “reciprocal 
acculturation” between such groups, or the idea that they had an equal effect on each other.48 
But too often nationalist writers minimize the impact of people, clans, and associations of tribes 
on larger groups such as Kievan Rus’. One historian called these early engagements with the 
Mongols the “most tragic events in the course of Russian history.”49 Many nationalist historians 
perceive Russia, by the thirteenth century, as a fully-functioning state, but that was not the 
                                                          
46 Allessandro Stanziani, After Oriental Despotism: Eurasian Growth in a Global Perspective (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2014), 19.  
47 Stanziani, After Oriental Despotism: Eurasian Growth in a Global Perspective 29.  
48 Stanziani, After Oriental Despotism: Eurasian Growth in a Global Perspective, 32.  
49 Silfen, The Influence of the Mongols on Russia, 15 
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case. Thinking of the early Russian territory as a “state” interacting with loosely connected, 
inferior nomadic tribes incorrectly presupposes a unified “Russia” before 1350.   
This century or so of war coincided with the Russians’ first exposure to the Mongols, 
which historians date to around 1223; the full force of the Mongol invasion struck between 
1237 and 1240. The principalities of Rus’ were scattered, and this disorganized structure of 
Russian politics enabled Mongol destruction of the eastern parts of Rus’. The semi-feudal 
nature of this period left princes with the primary duty of defense and collection of taxes from 
agrarian populations in only their own principalities, and as Paul Silfen argued, “regional 
interest overshadowed the vaguely felt need for national unity.”50 Princes in the south focused 
only on their own immediate interests. They refused to aid one another, and the Mongols easily 
took one city after another.  
Despite the vicious infighting, the church kept alive the idea of belonging to the same 
land, still a nebulous notion in this era. Each grand prince’s independence “never completely 
obliterated a certain sense of unity in Russia” centered on a shared language, history, and 
Kievan religious tradition.51 Nobody in the western Rus’ had any idea where these unknown 
people came from, who they were, what language they spoke, or what religion they followed.52 
Later rumors of conquests farther east painted the Mongols as heavy plunderers.53 Thus, in 
1250 Prince Mstislav of Galicia hoped to unite a number of principalities, including Kiev, against 
the Mongols. However, the weakness for the Russians was that they possessed no central 
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command and maintained little mutual contact between principalities. Because each 
principality fielded its own militia and generally did not coordinate with its neighbors, the 
Russians lacked a cohesive military unit. So, when the Mongol invasion began, the Russians 
were in no condition to offer any form of united resistance.  
In this period, identity in the form of political and military loyalty was tied to local towns 
and the surrounding agrarian farmland. Without a greater sense of union and cohesion, Rus’, 
politically, was simply a scattered arrangement of villages within the principalities, easy for the 
Mongol horde to conquer. Though some ambitious princes sought to control larger swaths of 
territory, each principality seemed to chart a separate destiny coalescing around their prince, 
and each might have proceeded at their own pace for some time, had the Mongols not arrived.  
After the initial invasion and first few years of occupation, in The Primary Chronicle on 
Dimensions Among the Princes of Rus’, bookmen wrote that the Mongol conquest was God’s 
punishment for the princes’ and their followers’ failure to follow Yaroslav’s advice. In 1054, 
right before his death, Yaroslav advised Russians to  
love one another, since ye are brothers by one father and mother. If ye dwell in amity 
with one another, God will dwell among you, and will subject your enemies to you, and 
ye will live at peace. But if ye dwell in envy and dissension, quarreling with one another, 
then ye will perish yourselves and bring to ruin the land of your ancestors, which they 
won at the price of great effort.54  
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Instead of heeding Yaroslav’s advice, the princes instead fought one another, and failed to 
honor one another. Yaroslav had fought tirelessly for years to bring peace to the Rus’ region, 
and finally succeeded. It appears that by wrecking the period of peace felt across the Rus’, the 
princes had forced God to punish them, and for these sins, the chronicles indicate that 
unknown tribes came.  
Most of the early writings from bookmen consist of accounts of death, destruction and 
suffering, which the bookmen argued, the Russian people endured as rightful victims for the sin 
they had committed: fighting with their brothers and ending the peace. Though they never 
explicitly mention it, this infighting represents one of the many sins the inhabitants of the Rus’ 
were committing that brought God’s wrath. The Chronicle of Novgorod states that in 1224: “for 
our sins, unknown tribes came, whom no one exactly knows, who they are, nor whence they 
came out, nor what their language is, nor of what their faith is, but they call them Tartars.”55 As 
the Mongol invasion continued, much of the chroniclers’ writing focused on the invaders’ 
destruction of Russian lives and property. In 1245, a papal envoy provided a vivid snapshot of 
Mongol ruthlessness: “when we passed through this region, we found lying in the fields 
countless heads and bones of dead people. . . Kiev had been reduced to nothing and the 
inhabitants left are held in the cruelest of slavery.”56 Other medieval sources present the 
Mongols as cruel and evil infidels, either instruments of the divine for Russian sins or henchmen 
of the Devil sowing discord.57 Again the Chronicle of Novgorod in 1224 states: “We know not 
whence they came, nor where they hid themselves again. God knows whence he fetched them 
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against us, for our sins.”58 The bookmen never explicitly state what these sins were; rather 
“sins” appears to represent an umbrella of things such as unholiness, idol-worship, and ignoring 
God. Thus, with no other way to explain the onslaught, bookmen wrote about Mongol raids and 
destruction as punishment.  
After the initial assault subsided, the Mongols ruled from the steppe, but this in no way 
lessened the influence on Russian political, economic, social, and culture life. Batu Khan, the 
grandson of the founder of the Mongol Empire Genghis Khan, was a ruthless leader whom 
many Russians feared. Later historians such as Leo de Hartog indicate that at no time during the 
13th or 14th century could the Russian princes have overcome the Golden horde.59 In “The Tale 
of the Ravage of Riazan,” an extract from the Typography Chronicle describing the utter 
destruction of the city of Riazan on the banks of the Voronezh River, the Mongols devastated 
the churches of God, “and in the holy altars they shed much blood. And no one in the town 
remained alive: all died equally and drank the single cup of death. There was no one there to 
moan, or cry. . . – but all lay together dead. And all this occurred to us for our sins.”60 The 
bookmen used such graphic descriptions over and over to continually portray the Russian 
people as helpless victims of the Mongols. 
The idea of suffering at the hand of God becomes even clearer in the First Novgorod 
Chronicle as the bookmen’s descriptions paint the Mongols in a negative light. Batu continued 
his devastation and captured Riazan on Dec. 21, 1237. The Chronicle mentions that the Mongols 
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“drowned many people in the river and killed every last monk. . .Not one man was left alive in 
the city. All lay dead together. And all this came to pass because of our sins.”61 By highlighting 
the monks, it infused the description with a Christian tone. In 1238, the Horde moves on 
Novgorod and bookmen describe how these “accursed godless strangers,” these “lawless 
Ishmaelites,” swarm “like locusts,” into the Russian land “cutting down everyone like grass.”62 
The Old testament references serve to paint the Mongols as a plague brought on because of 
unfaithful ways. Thus, bookmen were using familiar theological ideas to help them understand 
suffering in their world and later developed a narrative of Christian victimhood. In doing so, the 
common element that tied the inhabitants of Rus’ together into a vaguely-felt unity became 
Orthodoxy. 
Thus, in a series of sudden blows, the Mongols had destroyed cities in the central, 
eastern, and southern principalities. The conquest and years of occupation that followed 
became an awkward problem for Christian Russian writers and intellectuals. They, the wards of 
an invincible god, had been rapidly subjugated by infidel hordes whose power in the 
foreseeable future was clearly unassailable.63 Previous Kievan bookmen ignored cooperation 
and instead only wrote about battles and presented them in religious rather than political 
terms, which at this time, were inseparable. However, absolute and long-term subjugation was 
unprecedented in Russian history and brought obvious ideological ramifications: either God was 
not omnipotent- an unthinkable notion- or Mongol conquest was his will.64 As Halperin has 
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explained, “through an adept and remarkably consistent use of language, in which they 
eschewed the terminology of the conquest, the bookmen avoided coming to grips with the 
ideological conundrum of their own defeat,” referred to as the “ideology of silence.”65 
 The Primary Chronicle shows that the Russians were, of course, aware of the fact that 
they had been conquered, but “Russian writings from the Mongol period clearly show a clear 
rejection of the fact of conquest.”66 Thus, the people of the Rus’ understood their predicament, 
but chroniclers never explicitly stated this fact. Russian bookmen recorded the events of the 
period within the conceptual framework from the Kievan period by using notions of 
safeguarding the Christian ideological foundations of their society. But this framework came 
from an earlier era when no political conquests had taken place. Thus, the Russian bookmen, 
though touching on notions of victimhood and martyrdom, never mentioned political 
subjugation, and chose to deal with the reality of Mongol rule in ambiguous terms.67  
In the chronicles, the “ideology of silence” became a unifying sentiment in which Rus’ 
grand princes were protecting the Orthodox faith. For example, bookmen refer to princes 
(knyazi) who defended their lands until the bitter end as the princes of Ryazan, Gyurgi, and 
those of Murom and Pronsk, “without letting them in their towns, went to meet them and said 
to them: ‘only when none of us remain then all will be yours.’”68 Hence in the Novgorod and the 
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Vladimir Chronicles, princes appear, not simply defending their land holdings, but as defenders 
of the faith battling to save Christianity from marauding infidels driven by religious animosity.69 
How bookmen wrote about the treatment of members of the clergy who would not 
submit to Mongol rule further underscores the important of Orthodoxy. In one retelling, in 
1245 Batu Khan killed Prince Mikhail of Chernigov and his boyar Fyodor because they would not 
worship a bush and fire. Mikhail refused to take part in the pagan ritual of passing between two 
fires. Because Mikhail refused, executioners beat him over the heart with their hands and then 
with their feet. After a while, “a certain renegade, called Doman, cut off the head of the holy 
Grand Prince Mikhail and cast it aside.”70 What is significant about Mikhail is that many had 
gone before him and paid homage to Batu Khan and returned unharmed. The Chronicle of 
Novgorod states that Mikhail said “I wish to suffer for Christ and to shed my blood for the true 
faith.”71 The Nikonian Chronicle  goes further, pointing out that Mikhail, upset by seeing princes 
going to the horde and performing such rites became discomfited: weeping he said  
Do you see this woe and misfortune among our generation- that we, Christians and 
observers of Christ’s commandments, believing in Him, nonetheless deny Him by 
performing the Khan’s commands? Let us endeavor, my beloved, to be martyred for 
Christ, and then we will reign with Him in the ages. Let us trample Satan under foot, as 
well as the commands of his servant, the impure Khan.72  
                                                          
69 Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde, 62.  
70 The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016-1471, Translated by Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, (Academic International, 
1970), 88. 
71 The Chronicle of Novgorod 1016-1471, 90.  
72 The Nikonian Chronicle, Volume Three: 1241-1382, 17-18.  
Kessel 30 
 
By attaching the devil to the Mongols, bookmen created a religious dichotomy of good versus 
evil. These retellings of the Mikhail episode describe a firm religious resistance to the Mongols, 
not a political one.  
The Primary Chronicle describes that after Mikhail and Fyodor’s deaths “a pillar of fire 
appeared from earth to heaven over their honorable bodes, shining exceeding bright rays for 
the confirmation of Christians and for the conviction of the faithless who leave God and bow to 
things, and for the terrifying of the pagans.”73 The Nikonian Chronicle goes further and states 
that Mikhail’s decapitated head still spoke saying “I am Christian.”74 This tale shows how 
bookmen portrayed God on the side of the Russians and further used the martyrdom trope to 
illustrate a religious rejection of Mongol overlordship. The Chronicle of Novgorod provides 
many short examples of princes, merchants, and leaders paying tribute to the khan in the East. 
These princes are referred to as being “deceived by the glory of this world” and in doing so 
“destroyed their bodies and their souls.”75 In other words, martyrs, unlike these idol 
worshippers, kept their souls and could go to heaven. The significance of focusing on martyrs 
and denouncing those who caved reinforces the idea that the Russian bookmen understood 
Mongol occupation as chiefly a religious conundrum in which Christian Russians were superior 
to their conquerors.  
When the Mongols capture Prince Vasil’ko Konstantinovich in 1240 during the initial 
conquest, the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle indicates that he, too, preferred martyrdom to 
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entering Mongol service and exercising their volia (will). Later in the same Galician-Volhynian 
Chronicle of the thirteenth century, the word volia appears again, this time in relation to the 
Mongols using Russian subjects in campaigns against European powers in the west as many 
Russian mercenaries served the Mongol.76 The Chronicle continues the message that 
martyrdom was more valiant than submitting to Mongol will, but does not shed light on what 
exactly volia looked like. Having to submit or obey “will” clearly implies a subordinate 
relationship, but since princes like Konstantinovich or Mikhail avoided this fate by dying, there 
is no explanation of what this would have entailed. According to Halperin, “the term certainly 
seems to imply that the Russians were Tatar clients, maybe even vassals, but the Chronicle 
offers no explanations.”77 Again, omitting the seemingly obvious reality of Mongol political 
authority from the record appears to indicate Russian writers’ denial of it. According to 
Halperin, bookmen, as ecclesiastical writers, rejected Mongol political overlordship in the sense 
that they never openly acknowledged the link between Batu’s initial campaigns and the many 
evils they later suffered at the hands of the Mongols.78 However, the bookmen very well 
understood Mongol political authority in Russian lands. While Halperin’s interpretations are 
debatable, it also must have been the case that the bookmen were simply using their 
worldview to give a stricken, massacred population answers through a religious frame of 
reference. It’s how they understood their place in the world.  
Furthermore, what makes the bookmen’s writings and descriptions of their conquerors 
even more interesting is that apart from the occasional traveler or merchant, most writings 
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came from men who devoted their lives and careers to the church. Despite the destruction that 
accompanied the conquest in the thirteenth century, there was one glaring beneficiary of 
Mongol rule: the Orthodox Church. The Mongols practiced religious tolerance and respected 
“people of the Book,” which allowed Orthodoxy to survive and exempted the Church properties 
from taxation.79 This privileged status allowed the Church to grow even more. The Christian 
cross began to appear in more villages all cross the Rus’.   
In 1267, the Mongols announced a iarlyk (contract) that mandated that all those in 
direct service to the church were free from the payment of taxes, and from performing military 
service to the Mongols on the condition that in return the church offered prayers for the ruling 
khan and his family. It stated that “[No Mongol official] may request or collect from them, any 
tribute or ploughshare tax, or transport obligation, or food provisions.”80 If monks left the 
profession, however, they would lose this privileged status. This iarlyk proved beneficial for the 
Rus’, because, in theory, the Church rose “above the purely regional (principality) issues, and 
kept alive the sense of community among the people” across the lands of Rus’.81 Although this 
failed to achieve the desired result of “a common uprising against a non-Russian enemy, the 
Church prevented the loss of the concept of a common history and culture” through recording 
Kievan traditions and myths.82 In doing so, the Church pointed to the damage of the constant 
struggles between princes across principalities. The Golden Horde embraced Islam at the 
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beginning of the fourteenth century, and the Mongols continued to practice religious tolerance. 
They required only that the Church pray for the khan’s health and well-being. In return, the 
Mongols safeguarded the Church’s independence and helped to foster its immense growth over 
the course of the next century and a half.83 
 In 1313, the Mongols granted an Immunity Charter (iarlyk) to Metropolitan Peter. In it 
the Mongols proclaimed: “let no one offend against the cathedral church in Rus’ of 
Metropolitan Peter or against his people and his churchmen, and let no one take his property, 
lands, or people.” Furthermore, the Mongols warned that “no one is to interfere in church 
affairs” and “if someone violates church property or the metropolitan’s property, he shall die by 
terrible execution.”84 This iarlyk was significant in that it allowed the Church even further 
protection which included bookmen who continued to write uncensored and unsupervised by 
Mongol authorities.  
Throughout the second half of the thirteenth century, the Mongols were exploiting the 
social situation in Rus’ for their own ends. Russian princes remained on their respective 
thrones, but on the clear understanding that their right to rule depended on the consent of the 
Mongol khan.85 In this way, an overlord and vassal dynamic developed through the first few 
decades of occupation. However, the lack of unity among princes remained a crucial barrier to 
collective resistance. The internecine strife that was prevalent before the Mongols continued 
for decades after the conquest. Princes exploited every opportunity to extend their own 
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powers and believed their only choices were to: “be subject to the other princes, or dominate 
them.”86 Not only did princes have to worry about foreign invasion and high taxes from the 
Mongols, but they too still had to fear other princes. The Mongols knew this and expertly 
played princes off one another to increase the empire’s wealth. Thus, notions of loyalty went as 
far as the reaches of each principality even years after Mongol destruction. Far from a union, 
Russia remained a collection of disparate principalities.  
  Yet almost two decades after the initial conquest, the Chronicle of Novgorod indicates 
that the people of Novgorod began to grow disillusioned with Mongol policy. The first true 
peasant uprisings against the Mongols occurred in 1257 in Novgorod in reaction to the heavy 
taxes the Mongols had levied upon the people. When the Mongol tax collectors arrived in 1259, 
it led to “total uproar and terrorism” and “the people were agitated all year.”87 During this 
episode the people refused to give tribute and instead “the common people said let us die 
honorably for St. Sophia and for the angelic houses.” 88 This reference to St. Sophia is about 
protecting the Church in Novgorod, and here the bookmen portray the people protecting the 
Church against the “raw-eating…wild beasts.”89 The Prince of Novgorod, Alexander Nevsky, had 
the duty to protect those tax collectors and make sure they returned unharmed to the Mongol 
khan. Nevsky used harsh measures to achieve his ends and crushed the resistance, although the 
people wanted to go on fighting to the bitter end according to the chronicles. Grand Prince 
Nevsky understood the importance of loyalty to the khan. Though the townspeople harbored 
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bitterness toward the high Mongol taxes and oppression, Nevsky knew the repercussions from 
the Mongol khan would be worse than brutally suppressing his own townspeople. Grand Prince 
Nevsky sympathized with the people’s cause, but even all of Novgorod was no match for the 
Mongol Army; the Russians could not possibly mount a resistance to the Mongols in the 1260s 
and 1270s. This event is significant because it represents the beginning of popular resistance, 
first in Novgorod.  
Thus, by the end of the century, the Church had no reason to worry about retribution 
from the Mongols because the Mongols tolerated religion, but princes would face harsh 
consequences and thus found it in their best interest to brutally suppress uprisings. The 
Mongols rewarded the Church’s submission and established a Bishop in Sarai, the Mongol 
capital in present day southern Russia, in 1262 as The Chronicle of Novgorod tells us.90 This 
bishop functioned as a diplomat and mediator who maintained communication between the 
Golden Horde and the metropolitan in Vladimir.  
Bookmen fell back on the same ideological frameworks as the bookmen before them 
had used, but skirted notions of Mongol political authority in Rus’. In this way, bookmen 
painted Mongol devastation as God’s will, however, this writing is important because of the its 
connection to the political realm. Medieval politics and religion were inseparable and to think 
the bookmen saw the Russians as free and independent of the Mongols is naïve. After all, the 
perpetuation of the “ideology of silence” blended religion and politics. By using their familiar 
theological framework and never acknowledging their subordinate status, bookmen upheld the 
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sanctity of the Rus’ grand prince. They justified their political processes through religious 
superiority which supported the continued legitimacy of the tradition of the grand princes. 
Having provided a stricken and outraged people spiritual consolation by using their shared 
culture of Orthodoxy to explain the conquest, the bookmen then adjusted that frame of 
reference to help explain the Horde’s fracturing, military skirmishes, and the emergence of a 
political culture in the territory supporting Moscow.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
“The calamity [Mongol Occupation of the 14th century] was a blessing in disguise, for the 
destruction contained the boom of unity. . .another hundred years of princely feuds. . .What 
would have been the result . . .Moscow, in fact, owes its greatness to the Khans”91 
     −N.M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo, 18th Century 
 
 The Northeastern principalities of Russia had been subject to the Golden Horde, the 
successor state of the Mongol empire, for some 50 years by the turn of the century. The 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries witnessed the “absorption of the various grand and 
patrimonial principalities into the Grand Principality of Moscow.”92 Eventually, Moscow would 
assume the position of leadership in the Northeast of Russia, and by the end of the fifteenth 
century, Moscow united the semi-independent principalities under its rule.  
This chapter focused on the period of Mongol rule, approximately 1300-1380, that saw 
changes in the actions of princes, the growth of the church, and unity all due to Moscow’s 
growth. Throughout the century Moscow grew in importance initially due to good relations 
with the Mongols. But later, as the Mongol hold upon Rus’ became more tenuous, the khans 
built up Moscow as a buffer to counteract the growing Lithuanian presence, but the Golden 
Horde suffered its own problems. Eventually, Moscow’s, land, wealth, and pan-Rus’ support, 
became sufficiently strong to enable Moscow’s independent political and military action.93 
Overall, because of the developments both within the Northeastern principalities and the 
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politics of the Golden Horde, Moscow became the center of a Rus’ cultural, religious, and 
political identity that engendered open resistance and opposition to the Mongols. For these 
reasons, this chapter argues that the bookmen’s tone changed to transition from religious to 
political ideas, building around the rise of Moscow. These notions urged the preservation of 
Orthodoxy and a shared Russian culture and history, no longer martyrdom and suffering. 
Advantageous political developments such as the reciprocal growth of Moscow and the Church 
also encouraged harsher attitudes toward the Mongols reflected in the historical record.  
One of the difficulties in assessing the historical events in the fourteenth century is the 
fact that much of the archives in Moscow were burnt in 1395; however, town chronicles and 
other, smaller records remain.94 Apart from the damage to the historical record, the first half 
century of Mongol rule left the Eastern principalities severely damaged while the North and 
West provinces fared much better. For this reason, according to the chronicles, Moscow and 
Tver, situated in the west farther from the arm of Mongol destruction, required less 
rebuilding.95 Furthermore, these two centers lay near a network of waterways.96 These 
waterways and the geographic placement of the cities proved important for a second reason. 
The Mongols reached the zenith of their might in the early to mid-fourteenth century. As a 
result, they changed the trade routes to run through cities that best advanced their interests. 
Cities such as Tver and Moscow became central stops along this reorganized trade route. So, 
most of the initial growth of these cities was due to the Mongols’ fostering of international 
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commerce.97 As the economy recovered around 1300, the villagers began to build churches – a 
sure sign of improved economic health in the principalities.98 
Furthermore, the reason for the recovery was the fact that these two cities began to 
grow in power because they actively acquiesced to Mongol rule. Moscow’s princes early on 
were willing to do the khan’s bidding. In other words, they recognized what was advantageous 
to them. In the early fourteenth century, Mongol raids in the regions around Moscow 
weakened its chief rivals but left Moscow untouched and the principality’s population swelled. 
These developments strengthened the alliance between Moscow and the Golden Horde and 
made the grand prince even more powerful over his growing population.  
 Because of this quick recovery and advantageous position compared to other 
principalities, this century, marked by many changes in the Russo-Tatar dynamic, was the most 
important for the development of the Russian state – it elevated Moscow and its grand prince 
above all other principalities and proved that the politics of shrewdness paid off. Notions of 
community became less about one’s duty to one’s principality and more about general 
opposition to the Mongols. While the chronicles do provide some insight into how Church 
officials felt about the Mongols and their meddling in Russian affairs, “how the people felt 
about the Mongols is very difficult to ascertain” because contemporary records are incomplete 
and references to or descriptions of discontent are few.99 However, there was one stark 
exception, the Chronicles’ retelling of the early-fourteenth century Tverian uprising.  
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 In 1300, Metropolitan Maxim “unable to abide the violence of the Tatars in Kiev, left 
Kiev…and he settled in Vladimir.”100 This move effectively shifted the religious center from Kiev 
to Vladimir. So, beginning in 1304, both Tver and Moscow, the two most powerful provinces of 
the northwest, were vying for the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir from the khan because this 
title gave a grand prince superior status over all others. Around this same time, the Mongols 
scrapped the former baskak system which had employed baskaks, or appointed, governors, 
who resided in the principality and oversaw taxes and administration in major principalities. 
The new representatives of Mongol authority were by contrast, non-resident “envoys” (posoly). 
In doing so, the Mongols maintained their influence (or rather interference) in Russian affairs 
without having a representative in each town. No longer seated in the Russian cities, these 
envoys would travel from the Mongol capitol of Sarai to each city several times a year to collect 
tribute.   
The Tver uprising was sparked in 1327, when Chol-Han (or Shefkal), a representative of 
the Golden Horde, appeared with his envoy in Tver to collect tribute. The Mongol troops 
conducted themselves brutally in Tver and the Russian population suffered seriously. Most 
sources indicate that Grand Prince Alexander preached patience to his people, but the 
plundering and arrogant torture was too much of a strain. The Chronicle of Novgorod indicates 
that “Alexander killed a great many Tartars in Tver, and some merchants. For an important 
envoy had come from the Horde with a large number of Tatars, but they [Alexander and the 
people of Tver] did not receive them.”101 Thus, a massive riot ensued in which Chol-Han’s 
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troops were killed and he himself died.102 Only the few Tatars outside the walls tending to the 
horses escaped, fleeing back to the Horde.103 The Chronicle of Novgorod described that in the 
aftermath, “the same winter a very great force of Tatars came, and they took Tver, and to put it 
simply, laid waste all the Russian land, God and St. Sophia preserved Novgorod alone, and 
Prince Alexander fled to Pleskov.”104  
The historical record contains many similar retellings of the popular uprising in Tver in 
1327. For example, the Nikonian Chronicle mentions that Shefkal/Chol-Han “wanted to kill the 
princes of Tver and, himself, become prince of Tver and place his own Tatar lords in Russian 
cities, as well as convert the Christians to the Tatar faith.”105 This retelling is important because 
it casts Chol-Han as a usurper hoping to become the prince of a Russian town and do away with 
Orthodoxy. In this way, the chronicler writes that these two realities would have been 
unacceptable, and this provides the motivation for why the people fought. The importance of 
these entries is that the usual religious animosity infuses the narrative. But the chronicler’s use 
of the verb sidet (to sit) implies a change of suzerainty and political revolution and thereby an 
unacceptable change of dominion. Furthermore, the bookman mentions the devasting deaths 
men suffered to fight off this invasion in which “some of them were burned and some were cast 
into bonfires and burned there.”106 Again, this description from The Nikonian Chronicle plays up 
the threat the Mongols posed. As former bookmen used this suffering in the form of 
victimhood, here it seems that the motivation was more so to preserve Orthodoxy and Russian 
                                                          
102 Hartog, Russia and the Mongol Yoke, 82.  
103 The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471, 125.  
104 The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471, 125.  
105 The Nikonian Chronicle, Volume Three 1241-1382, 124-125.  
106 The Nikonian Chronicle, Volume Three 1241-1382, 125.  
Kessel 42 
 
control of Russian towns. Khan Uzbeg, when he heard about this news, was determined to 
“destroy them all and capture the entire remaining Russian land.”107 The descriptions of 
plundering and pillaging had now evolved into the Mongol’s desire to annex Rus’, convert the 
people, and attack Rus’ culture − a stark change in how the bookmen perceived Mongol raids.  
The uprising proved disastrous for the fate of Tver and beneficial to its rival principality, 
Moscow. In response to the uprising, Khan Uzbeg summoned Prince Ivan Kalita108 of Moscow to 
the Mongol capital of Sarai, and soon returned with a strong Mongol army with “five great 
temniks”109 to punish the rebellious city.110 In doing so Kalita proved Moscow’s superior loyalty 
and Khan Uzbeg passed the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir to the grand prince of Moscow in 
1332. What is interesting about this episode in The Nikonian Chronicle is that the bookman 
mentions the pillaging, destruction, and devastation Kalita and his Mongol armies caused, but 
the chronicle states that “there was over the entire Russian land great weariness and grief and 
bloodshed caused by the Tatars,” with no mention of Kalita.111 This bookman would not 
condemn Kalita who was most complicit but instead placed the blame solely on the Mongols, 
which indicates an understanding for Kalita’s following Khan Uzbeg’s orders. This example 
shows how the bookmen added complicitous princes in the maintenance of the “ideology of 
silence” as bookmen spared grand princes from the blame and only condemned the Mongols.  
 By undertaking the Mongols’ directive, Kalita gained favor. In acquiescing to the 
Mongols, Moscow was able to come out of the uprising with Khan Uzbeg’s support and the 
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most power in the region. Additionally, Moscow became richer and added cities and territories 
to its realm. Moreover, the Tverian uprising of 1327 in no substantial way loosened the 
Mongols’ grip on Russia. The events in Tver constitute a rebellion of sorts but not a mention of 
the theme of liberation from the Tatar yoke. However, although the Horde was, after all, at the 
zenith of its power and “military opposition still guaranteed disaster,” the uprising was a 
blatant indicator of the Tver residents’ anti-Mongol ideologies.112 Whether these Russian 
villagers were tired of tolerating barbarity or fed up with high taxes, they acted without 
Alexander’s approval and showed their disdain for Mongol authority. 
 Ivan Kalita, who ruled as Grand Prince of Moscow from 1325-1340, was one of the most 
important figures in the rise of Moscow. The Nikonian Chronicle mentions that in 1328, Kalita 
received the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir as well, along with “many other principalities from 
Khan Uzbeg, to have them under Moscow.”113 This title effectively gave him the right to collect 
tribute from other principalities, and the Novgorod Chronicle mentions Ivan’s acquisition of 
several small territories for his principality which brought even more financial outlay.114 In 
doing so, Ivan brought wealth and prestige to Moscow.  
 Kalita was essentially the khan’s vassal. Because of this alliance, Moscow and his 
patrimony were spared from Mongol raids. This was not a bad bargain.115 With this powerful 
leverage, he forced others to acknowledge his preeminence. In 1332 he occupied towns in 
Novgorod after the grand prince refused to supply silver he requested. Ivan “returned from the 
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Horde and threw upon Novgorod his wrath” according to the Chronicle of Novgorod.116 
Furthermore, in 1335 “having sent a force, [He] burned the Lithuanian towns of Osechen and 
Ryasna, and many others.”117 The bookman of Novgorod does not depict him as evil or that the 
Tatars forced his hand, just that his actions were punitive. Again, the bookmen do not condemn 
Kalita for his actions. They actually praised him because he: “completed the Church of the Holy 
mother of God in Zverinets, and Moisei the other of the Holy Resurrection of stone.”118 Because 
these descriptions come from the multiple different chronicles, this was not an example of one 
bookman. Bookmen from across the Rus’ did not condemn his actions but supported them.  
For a moment, we must pause and consider the bookmen’s plight. Many scholars have 
neglected the intangible intellectual dilemmas the Russian bookmen faced. One prime example 
is the fact that Grand Prince Ivan Kalita assisted the Mongols. In reality, no Russian bookman 
could directly applaud Kalita’s collaboration with the Tatars because they committed acts of 
violence against Russian Christians. However, his policy was a wise one in the sense that he 
saved Moscow from destructive raids. Thus, “Moscow’s bookman had to both deplore the 
actions of the Mongols, Russia’s bitterest enemies, and celebrate the deeds of Ivan Kalita- no 
easy task.”119 One bookman mentioned that after Ivan became the Grand Prince of Vladimir, in 
1328 “there was great tranquility in the Russian land for forty years, and the Tatars stopped 
campaigning in the Russian land.”120 While the Russians may not have suffered any devastating 
raids, to praise the prince for bringing tranquility to the region after annexing multiple 
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principalities with his retinue of Mongols is confusing in the text. Furthermore, The Nikonian 
Chronicle repeats the same phrase when describing Ivan’s trips back from the great khan in 
Sarai: “with grants and honors for his patrimony” which paints his bidding in a positive light.121 
In doing so, this bookman appears to intentionally leave out Ivan’s devastating raids with 
Mongol troops and instead glorifies him as a noble Russian prince. Thus, all bookmen deplored 
Mongol actions but not those of Grand Prince Kalita, an indication of where their allegiance 
remained. Thus, it appears that many supported Moscow’s growth and Ivan’s leadership, 
despite the reality that he was the khan’s vassal.  
 To understand this discrepancy in the text, one must also acknowledge the impact the 
Church had on Moscow’s ascendance and its subsequent challenge to Mongol power. The 
Orthodox Church formed the basis of Russian society and was pivotal in the survival and life of 
the early Russian state, and this underscored the religious dimension of Ivan Kalita’s rule.122 
After all, by preaching a common message across the Rus’ lands the church was “the only 
power which, structurally and ideologically, reached across the borders of the principalities.” 
Because Kalita was able to provide safety and security, the Church moved its hierarchy from 
Vladimir to Moscow in 1328 which effectively made Moscow both the political and religious 
center of the region.123 By moving the metropolitan’s seat to Moscow, the city effectively 
became the spiritual center of Russia and placed the metropolitan near the prince. This move 
“ensured that he could always count on the Church’s support.”124 Because of the strong 
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Orthodox roots across the Rus’, church support, brought with it, support from villagers and 
princes across the Rus’ regardless of principality. Since Vladimir I baptized Kiev, Orthodoxy and 
statehood were directly intertwined, and this relocation reaffirmed the relationship between 
the Orthodox Church and the now much more powerful Muscovite conglomerate.  
 In the years from 1341-1380, the Golden Horde fractured and weakened because of the 
effects of the Black Plague, uprisings, and family infighting. These blows contributed further to 
the strengthening of Moscow and Lithuania in the west and riper Rus’ sentiments of opposition. 
For in the fourteenth century, Lithuania first became a serious political power under their 
Grand Prince Gediminas. He succeeded in tearing away all the west and southwest of Rus’ 
which included Kiev, however, Moscow later destroyed the Republic to keep it from lapsing into 
Catholicism.125 In 1340 and 1341, three key rulers in Russian lands died: Khan Uzbeg, the khan 
of the empire, Ivan Kalita of Moscow, and Gediminas of Lithuania who had ruled since 1316.  
Their sons succeeded them and continued their policies unchanged and even charted 
news paths for expansion.126 But conflict started early within the Golden Horde, when Khan 
Ozbeg’s son Jani-Beg succeeded him. Arguments erupted in the family and this internal turmoil 
made the Golden Horde less able to intervene in wider politics. In Moscow, Ivan Kalita’s son, 
Semen, succeeded him. In 1345, the plague killed Semen in Moscow and his sons and 
succession went to Ivan II of Moscow.127 In 1346, the khan granted Ivan II the iarlyk to rule to 
use these Northeast principalities of Russia as a buffer to Lithuania. Yet Ivan II earned the 
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epithet “the Meek” and ceded land to the growing Lithuanian power in the west. He died in 
1359, leaving his nine-year-old son as his successor.128   
In the Golden Horde, instability became the main theme of the next two decades. What 
is so ironic about the period is that Jani-Beg, the successor of Khan Uzbeg, conquered 
Azerbaijan during this era of supposed weakness. His acquisition effectively gave him more land 
than any prior khan of the Golden Horde. But he died in 1357. His son, Berdi-Beg, succeeded 
him and died from poisoning in 1359, an obvious sign of political turmoil, and after his death a 
civil war broke out in the Golden Horde that lasted almost twenty years. Again in 1363-66 the 
Black Death claimed many lives in both Russia and the Golden Horde.129 This lack of stability 
further plagued the Golden Horde as from 1360-80 fourteen different khans followed each 
other in rapid succession. In 1360, the Chronicle of Novgorod indicates that “there was a great 
tumult in the Horde; many Tsars with their wives and children were killed, and the men of the 
ranks fought against each other.”130 The chronicles describe these years as favorable for the 
Russians: “Among them (the Mongols) there were great famine and troubles and great discord, 
and they did not cease from waging war among themselves, and they fought and shed blood. In 
this way, God sent His wrath against them, being merciful toward his servants, the humble 
Orthodox Christians.”131 Over a century after the initial invasion, bookmen explained the 
Mongols in a new way. The text mentions shedding blood against an unrelenting political foe 
and the Russian people’s favorable position with God. Ultimately, the bookmen’s writings paint 
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the Mongols as political adversaries through attitudes of military opposition and religious 
superiority not like the previous theme of martyrdom.  
Thus, as The Nikonian Chronicle indicated in the 1330s, there actually was a forty-year 
period in which Mongol campaigns ended and “there was great tranquility.”132 This period was 
far from tranquil as the Lithuanian aggression in the west grew, but this bookman certainly 
prefers this challenge to Mongol pillaging. During this period from 1330 to 1370, the chronicle 
record mentions the Mongols only in reference to Russian envoys seeking the title of grand 
prince but always in vague detail. Instead, bookmen focused on the founding and erecting of 
thousands of churches across the land. Conflicts in the Horde prevented the great khan from 
launching raids into the Russian lands.  
By 1370, the reduced meddling from the Golden Horde and the Horde’s instability had 
allowed Moscow to firm up control across the region unassailed. After much quarreling and 
jockeying, Novgorod had made peace with Moscow just a few years earlier in 1367: “The 
people of Novgorod sent petitions and gifts to Grand Prince Dmitri [of Moscow] asking for 
peace and he concluded peace with them.”133 In 1371, because Tver would not submit to 
Moscow, Dmitri “marched into Tver’ land. He took Zubstev…Mikulin…And he burned and 
captured all lands and towns in the land of Tver’, burning and devastating everything.”134 In 
1372, he returned from the Horde with “many honors there and, again, the charter [iarlyk] for 
the Grand Principality [of Vladimir]. Thus, he strengthened his position in the grand principality 
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and put his enemies to shame. Together with him came the khan’s envoys and many Tatars.”135 
In essence from 1360-1375, Dmitri was consolidating his power and expropriating towns and 
principalities such as Torzhok, Novgorod, and Tver that would not concede to him.  
 This development in Rus’ left Moscow superior to the other principalities and the Horde 
in a precarious position. In 1375, supported by many Russian princes, Dmitri attacked Tver. He 
was joined by “all the Russian princes” as well as “many other princes with all their forces” 
according to The Nikonian Chronicle.136 During this important campaign, approximately twenty 
Russian grand princes joined Moscow and de facto accepted Muscovite leadership. This was a 
major step toward unification of Russia. Besides Tver’, only three princes- of Riazan, Pronsk, 
and Mozhaisk- did not join Moscow. The hatred stemmed from Grand Prince Mikhail of Tver’s 
support for Olgerd of Lithuania who succeeded Gediminas and the new Great Khan Mamai: 
“how much harm has he caused the Christians? And now he has allied himself with 
Mamai…This mamai breathes hatred for us and if we let them join forces they will defeat us 
all!”137 It seems that all the Russian princes were upset at the Prince of Tver’s alliance with the 
Tatars and the Lithuanians which had allowed the Duchy of Lithuania to expand onto Rus’ lands, 
within approximately fifty miles of Moscow. These foes were their most dangerous enemies, 
and the coalition of Russian princes decided to root out this treason in the very heart of the 
Rus’.  Thus, these attitudes represented a strong, unified allegiance to Moscow in opposition to 
the foreign enemies.  
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When Lithuanian support for Tver did not materialize, the city conceded to Dmitri who 
degraded the grand prince of Tver to a subordinate of Moscow.138 The Mongols declined, or 
failed, to interfere: the constant squabbling in the Golden Horde meant that the Mongols 
exerted less influence on lands of Rus’. Bookmen wrote that after this victorious campaign, 
“even Tver’ promised to fight on the side of Moscow against the Tatars” according to The 
Nikonian Chronicle.139 Moreover, through his actions, Grand Prince Dmitri portrayed himself as 
the “protector of Russian national interests” and had unified the principalities. He had united all 
the Russian lands. As a result, bookmen, princely, and villager identity in the lands of Rus’ was 
either directly associated with or obedient to Moscow. Having consolidated most of Rus’, no 
principality dared test Moscow or Dmitri after his annexation.  
Up until the middle of the fourteenth century, Moscow had strengthened itself with the 
Mongols’ aid, but when the Horde began to show clear signs of weakness, Moscow began to act 
independently. Internal conflict in the Golden Horde combined with Dmitri’s rejection to pay 
tribute led an emir of the Golden Horde, Mamai, to attack Moscow in 1380. When Dmitri 
declined to pay tribute to Mamai, a decision which historically had ended poorly for any Russian 
prince, the die was cast. The record indicates that the “pagan race of Ishmaelites was rising 
against the Christians” and that Mamai was “savagely enraged against Veliki Knyaz (the grand 
prince) and all the Russian land.”140 As a result, on September 1, 1380 the “Tatar army 
combined with that of Lithuania at the Oka River” to ravage Moscow in what became known as 
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the Battle of Kulikovo.141 These descriptions paint the Mongols as barbarians threatening 
Russian existence.  
Dmitri led an army that consisted of mostly Russians and a few Tatar mercenaries. He 
knew the battle was imminent and thus assembled his troops of about 30,000 men, and the 
grand princes of Suzdal, and Nizhni Novgorod remained behind to “cover the flank and guard 
the middle loop of the Volga” river.142 On September 8, the Russians met the Mongols in the 
field. Modern scholars explain that the battlefield, “with its ravines and numerous 
watercourses, hindered the deployment of the Tatar cavalry, which was the very foundation of 
their military power.”143 Ultimately, the Russians won the bloody battle and chased the 
Mongols off. Although both sides lost a considerable number of men, the battle was considered 
a Russian victory.   
The bookmen express attitudes of Russian unity and superiority to the Mongols 
throughout the chronicles with many dramatic descriptions of the Battle of Kulikovo. While the 
first version was only a few lines, later retellings dramatized the event and underscored the 
collective Russian attitude of the preservation of Russian ways and hatred toward the Mongols. 
Bookmen wrote about the victory using religious imagery in new ways with notions of unity and 
safeguarding Russia. The Novgorod Chronicle and Nikon Chronicle both allude to Dmitri’s return: 
“having stoutly fought with the aliens for God’s holy churches, for the Orthodox faith and for all 
the Russian lands; he himself, preserved by God, came back to his own great city.”144 In the 
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same way the Novgorod Chronicle creates a religious moment: “and this was because of our 
sins: the aliens took up arms against us, that we might renounce our wrong doings and hatred 
of our brethren, from our love of silver, and from wrong judging and violence.”145 The Nikonian 
Chronicle describes a much more dramatic tale in which Dmitri prayed hard: “O Lord, since 
those days [of Batu] have fear and trembling been with us! And do not oh Lord, once again raise 
Thy wrath against us to the end!”146 Another dramatic retelling describes how in unison all the 
princes said “We are ready to endure, in the name of Christ, for the Christian faith, and [to 
avenge] your offenses!” in support of Dmitri.147 The significance of these descriptions is that 
each one paints the cause simply: a unified Russian force overwhelms the Mongol oppressors 
who were attempting to destroy the lands of Rus’.   
Another example of this overarching message of protecting the Rus’ and Orthodoxy 
came from The Nikonian Chronicle. The bookman mentions a speech Dmitri delivered to his 
men: “An honorable death is better than an evil life. Let us cross the river Don and then 
sacrifice our heads there for the sake of the holy Orthodox Churches, for the Orthodox faith, for 
our brethren and for Christianity!”148 Although the records of all the slain men hint at 
victimhood and martyrdom, this time bookmen used religious imagery to encourage and glorify 
collective Russian resistance. Some bookmen acknowledged how the surviving Russians buried 
bodies for eight days, further underscoring notions of brotherhood and community. No longer 
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were bookmen discussing heaps of dead bodies because of Russian sins, such victimhood and 
death for Orthodoxy was valiant and courageous and served to beat back the Horde.  
 After this battle, Tokhtamish, the ruler of the eastern wing of the Golden Horde, chased 
Mamai out and succeeded him as khan of the Golden Horde.149 With his entire army in the 
summer of 1382, Tokhtamish moved on Moscow. The citizens foolishly opened the gates and 
the Mongols unleashed a terrible slaughter on the people and plundered Moscow. Dmitri and 
his family fled. Tokhtamish’s vengeance made it clear that it was not yet fully possible to throw 
off the authority of the Golden Horde.  
Although almost all of the primary sources from the subsequent century indicate that 
the battle was a Russian victory, some contemporary historians question whether the battle 
was a true “victory.” After all, Dmitri’s forces were decimated and just two years later, he was 
unable to stop Tokhtamish’s invasion. As Donald Ostrowksi, a contemporary American 
historian, has observed, “Dmitri may have taken his campaign against Mamai as a reason to end 
tribute paying, but Tokhtamish would not let him get away with it.”150 In the end, it seems this 
“victory” changed nothing in terms of Moscow’s immediate political relationship to the Golden 
Horde.  
However, Russian nationalist historians of the nineteenth century interpreted the battle 
differently. According to Imperial Russian historian Sergei Soloviev, “the Russian defeat of the 
Tatars at the battle of Kulikovo Field was an event of global significance.”151 He ranked it with 
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such victories of “Europe” over “Asia” as the Battle of the Tours in 732 which many believe 
halted the Islamic invasion of Europe and preserved Christianity; however, the fact that two 
years later Tokhtamish sacked Moscow leading to another hundred years of Mongol 
domination, undermines his argument. Additionally, it appears that bookmen employed the 
same language when discussing the Mongols by casting Russo-Mongol relations in the light of a 
religious struggle. For this reason, some have argued that there was “no place for such a vision 
of liberation from a political subjugation that had never been acknowledged.”152 But, the 
chronicles suggest that the dominance of religious matters in Russian relations to the Tatars 
seems to have provided the basis for the emergence of a politically oriented ideology that 
would eventually become one of national liberation.153 In contemporary Russian memory, 
Kulikovo field had two profound effects: it is the place where Russians came divided but left as 
a nation and designated Dmitri Donskoi as the standard bearer of Christianity.154   
Although the Novgorod and Primary Chronicles, as well as contemporary historians, 
have usually exaggerated the victory at Kulikovo, “it is beyond doubt that the grand prince of 
Moscow was held in high regard for this triumph.”155 The battle still had some significance, at 
least psychologically, to the Russian princes and people. Overall, the Mongols had suffered 
defeats before, but this was the first time in such a grand battle that pitted the unified Rus’ 
grand princes against a large Mongol army. As a result, Moscow gained prestige within the 
Russian principalities and international relations, and while the army had consisted of 
                                                          
152 Halperin, The Tatar Yoke, 136.  
153 The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471, 157-160.  
154 Martin Sixsmith, Russia: A 1,000-Year Chronicle of the Wild East (New York: The Overlook Press, 2011), 27.  
155 Hartog, Russia and the Mongol Yoke, 97.  
Kessel 55 
 
detachments from many principalities, it was Moscow who received the honor by taking the 
initiative in the campaign.156  
To understand why this growing sentiment in the chronicles was so important, one must 
understand how the victory changed the Russian state’s political power dynamic. Kiev had 
stood as the central city of the Russian principalities for centuries, as the origin of the people of 
Rus’. Because of this cultural importance, Kiev originally upheld Orthodoxy and provided loose 
cohesion between the separate principalities. However, the battle at Kulikovo affected Kiev’s 
central place in the minds of Russians. First compiled in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles (Polnoe Sobranie Russkikh Letopisei), states that “the 
successful challenge of the Mongols in 1380 elevated Moscow to the leading principality in the 
Northeastern Rus’.”157 Culturally, politically, and spiritually, Moscow was the most powerful 
and influential principality in the region; this military victory just reaffirmed that status. For the 
rest of the century, bookmen acknowledged that all princes and villagers alike propped up 
Moscow’s supremacy.  
Furthermore, the chronicles indicate that many churches were founded in Dmitri’s 
name in the next two years all across the land.158 This construction underscores the religious 
significance of the victory. According to the Zadonshchina, an epic poem narrating the events of 
the battle from the end of the fourteenth century, the “glory extended to the sea and to the 
Iron Gates on the Danube, to Rome and Constantinople, announcing that Rus’ had overcome 
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the heathen…The whole earth was in awe of the grand prince.”159 Ultimately, the 1380 victory 
and the Church’s prominent position in society allowed the bookmen to produce attitudes of a 
unified Rus’ focused on overthrowing the Mongols.    
In the fourteenth century, bookmen adjusted their worldview and espoused greater 
notions of community and brotherhood. This message of pan-Russianness disseminated from 
Moscow, now both the religious and political center as notions of loyalty became less about 
one’s duty to one’s principality and more about Moscow’s leading role in general opposition to 
the Mongols. As former bookmen had used messages of suffering and victimhood, in this 
century, the motivation was to preserve Orthodoxy and Russian control of Russian towns 
highlighted by the threat the Mongols posed to these traditions. Just as they had in the prior 
centuries, bookmen continued to use religious imagery to explain and justify warfare, but this 
time they used religion to encourage and glorify collective Russian resistance. Ultimately, 
bookmen wrote with stronger notions of unity.  
This shift reflects the circumstances of the time. Moscow’s political power was 
unassailable across the lands of the Rus’ and the bookmen fell in line with this development. 
The bookmen were preaching notions of safeguarding the Rus’, which included Orthodoxy and 
political authority, because safeguarding the lands of the Rus’ also meant preserving each of its 
institutions such as the Orthodox Church, the Grand Prince of Vladimir, the rota system, and 
the coalition that supported Moscow. Having ushered in an era of unprecedented brotherhood 
and community by rousing men to defend the fatherland, Moscow, in the next century, would 
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dislodge itself from the Mongol yolk and chart a path to independence built upon these same 
messages of preservation and integration.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
 The crucial development in Russian politics during the fourteenth and fifteenth century 
was Moscow’s absorption of the various grand and patrimonial principalities into the single 
Grand Principality of Moscow, becoming Muscovy by 1500. Eventually, Moscow brought a 
sense of unity and hierarchical control to the semi-independent principalities under its rule. 
Moscow’s land, wealth, and pan-Russian support became sufficiently strong to allow it 
independent political and military action. Because of the developments both among the Rus’ 
principalities and the internal politics of the Golden Horde, Moscow became the center of a 
Rus’ cultural, religious, and political identity. The Mongols maintained “unrelenting pressure on 
the Russian forces” and gradually compelled them to rally for self-defense and pursuit of 
greater freedom of trade, commerce and colonization.160 While the first chapter witnessed 
bookmen writing about suffering and bookmen in the fourteenth century writing about 
preservation of Orthodoxy, this chapter seeks to argue that the developments of the fifteenth 
century allowed Russian bookmen, who did not specifically acknowledge Russia’s political 
subjugation, to practice and spread an attitude of open resistance to the Mongols. The 
bookmen continued to practice the “ideology of silence” and in the fifteenth century described 
the Mongols but never addressed the true political status of Russia under the Horde or the 
issue of conquest. Always in religious terms, these chronicle entries shed light on the attitudes 
of the development of more general anti-Mongol sentiments combined with this “silence” to 
support Moscow’s legitimate political authority.  
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It would be in this century that Mongol rule officially ended in Russia, and The Nikonian 
Chronicle, provides the most helpful, detailed resources for this episode. Most importantly, The 
Nikonian Chronicle shows a shift in that the bookmen begin to condemn those who did not 
resist the Mongols. When chroniclers discussed inhabitants of the Rus’ in prior centuries whom 
the Mongols conquered that did not defend themselves, it was “because they were not 
courageous enough.”161 Furthermore, bookmen in 1423 wrote: “Those who fled to foreign 
lands with wealth and gold, wives and children, have lost their soul and body and think that 
those who died during the initial conquest are better off then they who wander homeless 
through foreign land.”162 Notions about Russians being distinct and heroic over the Mongols 
pervades this text and criticizes those who lost hope. This chapter will illustrate how bookmen 
used such ideas to support the political authority of Moscow.  
Following Dmitri Donskoi’s victory at Kulikovo field in 1380, chroniclers wrote that “the 
victory implanted the vision that, someday, Russia would be free from Tatar Tutelage.” In 
Dmitri’s will he explicitly stated: “My children will not pay tribute.”163 The Moscow princes 
considered this struggle to be a battle for preservation of the traditional grand principality 
which brought with it the ancient claims of authority among the fraternal princes of Russia. In 
this way, scribes and chroniclers were correct when they wrote about Alexander Nevsky or 
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Dmitri Donskoi as precursors to the urge toward a strong central authority under the grand 
prince.164 
As Moscow continued to grow in power and numbers, the grand prince became an 
increasingly significant political actor. Vasili I reigned as grand prince of Moscow from 1389-
1425, a period in which Moscow was in repeated conflict, swinging wildly from one alliance to 
another. Next came Vasili II (1425-1462), who became ruler at the age of ten and survived 
family infighting over the throne within the Muscovite Principality. One of the most important 
events of the reign of Vasili II was the emancipation of the Russian Church from the Patriarch of 
Constantinople. The Byzantine Empire collapsed in 1453, which left the Russian Orthodox 
Church as the bearer of Orthodoxy. No longer looking to Byzantium for guidance or to promote 
bishops or metropolitans, the Russian Orthodox Church operated autonomously.   
 It was Ivan III, however, who would end the overlordship of the Golden Horde in 1480 
at the Battle of the Ugra River and build the foundation of the Russian state. His two greatest 
acquisitions were Novgorod and Tver, both achieved by force of arms. Under him, the people of 
the Rus’ found themselves united under a single ruler for the first time since Yaroslav the 
Wise.165 The phrase “gathering of the lands” is used many times throughout The Nikonian 
Chronicle to mean a unification of various territories under the rule of Moscow.166 This 
historical reference became important because it resembled the unity of Kiev, a national trope 
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dating back to the 1100s bookmen recycled to bolster ideas of continuity and sameness of the 
Russian people. 
With these annexations, by 1480, the Tatar power over Russia had diminished 
significantly and Ivan’s eventual defeat of the Mongols in battle in 1480 was “heralded as a 
victory for Russia and the Orthodox faith against the Horde and their alleged Polish (and, 
therefore, Catholic) allies.”167 Whereas in 1380 prior bookmen had portrayed beating back the 
Golden Horde as a battle to preserve Orthodoxy: “Let us sacrifice our heads there for the sake 
of the holy Orthodox Churches, for the Orthodox faith, for our brethren and for Christianity and 
the Rus’”168, these later fourteenth- and fifteenth-century bookmen again underscore feelings 
of country and courage in 1480: “O, brave and courageous Russian sons, try to defend your 
country, Russian land, from the Tatars! Make all necessary sacrifices in order to put an end to 
the burning and pillaging of your homes, the killing of your children, and the abusing of your 
wives.”169 Bookmen painted the struggle it terms of open resentment. These notions are much 
more nationalistic than religious and point to protecting the Rus’ people not just Orthodoxy, a 
key evolution in the attitudes toward the Mongols.  
After the retributive defeat at the hands of Toktamysh, the Grand Khan, in 1380, 
Moscow was able to restore its fortunes much more quickly than would otherwise have been 
the case because of the strong leadership of Vasili I. Vasili I succeeded Dmitri Donskoi, and for 
several years, he continued to travel to Tokhtamysh to pay tribute. At the beginning of the 
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fifteenth century, however, radical changes were taking place as the relationship changed 
because Tokhtamysh campaigned against the rebel Tamerlane. At the end of the fourteenth 
century in the Horde a power struggle erupted between Tokhtamysh and Tamerlane, a usurper 
who decried himself great khan. When Tamerlane came to Moscow, Vasili I mounted an army, 
but the chronicler wrote that “a vision of the Virgin defending Moscow with a heavenly host 
convinced him to turn back.”170 This infighting in the Golden Horde continued until the Grand 
Khan Toktamysh’s death in 1419. This event saw many Tatars flee the Horde and, after having 
been baptized, enter the service of the grand prince of Moscow.171 The infighting in the Horde 
placed many prominent Tatars on the losing side and made them fear for their lives. This fear 
caused much of the exodus from the Golden Horde. Grand Prince Vasili I wanted to exploit this 
situation. In doing so, he refused to pay tribute or respects to the khan. 172  
Two things had become apparent. By the end of the fourteenth century, Moscow had 
fully assumed the historic and traditional significance as the seat of the foremost Russian 
prince. This honor was assumed by Muscovy.173 Secondly, the Horde was disintegrating. 
Infighting, the rise of more powerful kingdoms in Europe, succession woes, and the Horde’s loss 
of territory were the chief causes. According to Hartog, in eastern Europe, the Golden Horde 
was no longer feared and, in a way, had become only a “pawn in other states’ political power 
games.”174 Thus, this hyperbolic anecdote is the only explanation for the way the Golden Horde 
continued to exist as one polity for almost another century.  
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 An important development for Russian attitudes of resistance around the mid-fifteenth 
century that firmly established Muscovy’s authority by 1500 was the autonomous divergence of 
the Russian Orthodox Church from Byzantium. Before Mongol rule, the Church in 
Constantinople had appointed the metropolitan to serve as the head of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. However, the situation changed in 1237 with the Mongol invasion. During the first 
century of Mongol rule, two Greeks, three Russians, and a Bulgarian had filled the office of 
metropolitan. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the metropolitan’s connection with 
the ruling house in Moscow brought changes in the relationship with Constantinople.175 As 
Moscow grew in power, the grand princes and other elites rejected the Byzantine emperor’s 
proposed candidates and met him with opposition. The Chronicles indicate that in 1398, Vasili I, 
the grand prince at the time, answered the Emperor in a letter “We have a church but we 
neither have a basileus (emperor), nor do we reckon one.”176  
Radically, in 1448 the Russian Orthodox Church chose to appoint their own metropolitan 
and ignored the Byzantines. This decision, in practice, made the Russian church fully 
independent.177 Not long after in 1453, the Ottomans conquered Constantinople and 
thereafter, Muscovite Russia was the only major state whose government and people were 
Eastern Orthodox. For Russian churchmen this meant that they stood alone in the world, their 
chief protector was the grand prince of Moscow.178 
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Between 1350-1450 the genre of writings reflected Church leaders’ development of 
concepts and mythologies that suited “Russian” ecclesiastical interests but also bestowed a 
legitimacy on the princes and elevated their status above others.179 These descriptions from the 
Trinity Chronicle placed Moscow at the cultural and ecclesiastical center, heir of Kiev, and 
original seat of the metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia.”180 While the symbolism had been there 
for a few decades, they came into sharp focus by the mid fifteenth century with the Church’s 
independence. In 1453 the fall of Byzantium validated these convictions in the chronicles.181  
Furthermore, The Nikonian Chronicle specifically makes references to old patron saints 
and former metropolitans such as St. Vladimir. Whereas St. Vladimir had introduced Orthodoxy 
to the land, writers wrote that Vasilli II protected it.182 This gave him spiritual authority and a 
clear religious base of sovereignty. This independent religious mythology from the Byzantines 
emphasized the political sagacity of Moscow’s grand princes. This development affected the 
character of the bookmen’s writings because the Russian Orthodox church was appropriating 
Russia’s Kievan past. Donald Ostrowski sees the creation of the “virtual past,” as a shared 
history that started with Kiev and ended with Moscow, designating Muscovy the true inheritor 
of Kievan Rus’ and Byzantium. Unlike historians such as Halperin, he interprets such 
“inheritance” as serving to deny Muscovy’s status as inheritor of the Tatar Khanate.183 This 
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formation of a common historical arch through the creation of an agreed-upon “virtual past” 
was a way to distance the emerging empire from Mongol lineage.184  
A second example of the bookmen’s rationalization behind political authority was their 
use of the Chingisid principle. While Muscovite bookmen charted the “virtual past” they also 
manipulated the Chingisid principle, a precept in Mongol politics that khans could only be direct 
descendants of Chingis (Genghis) Khan. It becomes clear in the Chronicles that Muscovite 
writers used this principle whenever internal conflict occurred in the Golden Horde not only as 
ammunition for attacks on Russia’s enemies, but also to justify Russian actions as well. For 
example, Dmitri Donskoi’s absence after Moscow was sacked following the battle of Kulikovo 
field is treated as an act of respect for Chingisid legitimacy. In this way in the chronicles, the 
bookmen were condemning the usurper, Mamai, they had defeated in the field while honoring 
the “true” leader Toktamysh. Thus, it appears that Muscovite writings from the era show a 
remarkable concern for the Chingisid principle considering that from the Russian Orthodox 
viewpoint all infidel rulers were equally illegitimate.185  
After the defeat of the Great Horde in 1480 along the banks of the Ugra River, Moscow’s 
princes played upon their status as conqueror of the steppe.186 Using these narratives to remain 
sensitive to steppe traditions brought practical advantages from other nomadic groups such as 
tribute and domain over the region’s fur trade as well.187 However, some historians have 
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pointed out the ideological ramifications and politically illegitimate claims for Russian grand 
princes to label themselves as successors to the khan as being at odds with Russian Orthodoxy. 
For this reason, the idea of Moscow as the successor state of the Golden Horde, is rarely 
mentioned in contemporary sources.188 Yet they still invoked the Chingisid principle to reap the 
benefits of sending fighting men and paying taxes from steppe peoples who upheld it.  
It seems the bookmen were able to pretend that Russia was still independent, at the 
beginning of the century, because the Russian princes continued to sit on Russia’s thrones and 
Tatars were seen only intermittently in their forests. But the bookmen knew better. They were 
the ones who often traveled to Sarai, the Mongol capital, with princes and the metropolitan 
and dealt with Mongol officials and rulers. Historians thus interpret the incorporation of the 
Chingisid principle as the bookmen’s preference to leave the “link between Russian acceptance 
of Mongol sovereignty” ambiguous because it was both viable and beneficial to their political 
gain.189 In doing so, Muscovite rulers borrowed what they wanted from the Chingisid legitimacy 
− territory and ruling legitimacy from other nomadic groups and screened out what it did not − 
Islam and the role as the Golden Horde’s successor state.190  Muscovite autocrats made the 
crumbling Mongol imperial traditions serve their purposes, but since Muscovy could not 
present itself as a new khanate without undercutting its Christian ideology, the stance was 
rarely made explicit. In this way, Moscow claimed political authority to foster continued growth 
and to increase wealth.  
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The autonomy of the Church and the Muscovite bookmen’s manipulation of certain 
principles all culminated in the battle on the Ugra River that occurred in 1480. It is one of the 
most interesting episodes because of the multitude of descriptions and interpretations of the 
otherwise ordinary events. At the Urga River in March of 1480, the Russian and Tatar forces 
fought for two weeks with harquebuses but neither side could reach a military advantage. 
According to Halperin, the diversity of the sources- chronicles, stories, and contemporary 
retellings- concerning the battle of 1480 is greater than for any other event in Russo-Tatar 
history.191 In the late 1470s, Ivan III had not accepted Great Khan Akhmat’s request to come to 
Sarai and ceased to pay the annual tributes. As a result, in 1480, the Great Horde under Khan 
Ahkmat attacked Ivan III’s troops near the Ugra River. Both sides came face to face across the 
river, exchanged a few volleys for a few days and then both retreated.192 The Nikonian 
Chronicle states in 1480 that “for many days they fought on both sides of the river” but 
provides very few details about the battle itself.193 The Chronicle uses the word “miracle” to 
describe the odd altercation and mentions that upon fleeing, Akhmat was slain by his brother-
in-law. In doing so, “did God save the Christians from the infidel Tatars.”194  
Bookmen wrote about the events more dramatically than military leaders. “Stand on the 
Urga,” an anonymous work of the 1550s added numerous fictional details that made the 
“overthrow of the Tatar yoke” an irresistible invention for historians to adopt. Though in reality 
the battle changed relations little if at all, it marked the last time the great horde attacked 
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Muscovy. Writers in 1510 wrote that the battle had great consequences for Orthodoxy in 
Russia. It would be in this year, that a writer for the first time, referred to Moscow as the “Third 
Rome,” a nod to the state Muscovy was building as successor to the greatness of Rome.195  
While the chronicles and later writings express solely religious notions about the battle, 
there were political ramifications as there could not have been a separation of the political 
from the religious. In The Nikonian Chronicle the antagonism between Ivan III and Akhmat is 
religious rather than political.196 Although it was a military altercation, the Chronicles depict the 
Russians as preserving Orthodoxy. In reality, the Great Horde never attacked again, and it 
seems they were attempting to use this campaign as a last-ditch effort to restore influence over 
Moscow. In keeping with the same Kievan practice of avoiding political subservience, the 
chroniclers avoided concepts of conquest and liberation. They paint relations in terms of 
religious hostility, not political suzerainty.197  
However, the narrative of the events of 1480 changed over time, and as early as 1502, 
the descriptions were slightly different. These chronicle entries underscore the necessary fight 
to “protect the fatherland (otechestvo).”198 The entry suggests that Russian bravery and success 
came from the Russian Orthodox faith, which earned Russia the protection of the Virgin Mary, 
very different than the miracle it was lauded as just two decades earlier. Furthermore, Vassian 
Rylo, the bishop of Rostov and an outspoken writer who advocated for an offensive policy 
against Akhmat was the author of “Epistle to the Ugra River” (Polslanie na Ugru). Though the 
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date is unknown, the text links the 1480 battle with Moses’s’ Exodus from Egypt.199 Vassian 
continues to pick the same words as previous chroniclers and finesses political theory. Vassian 
concludes about Akhmat’s fate that “all of his clan (rod) perished, his places (mesta) became 
empty, and God freed (osbodi) Rus’ from the unclean infidels. The realm (derzhava) and glory 
(slava) of Akhmat were eliminated.”200 He uses the word freed, but it is not clear from what. In 
doing so, he equates the stand at the Ugra river with the end of the Tatar problem. In fact, the 
final destruction of the Golden Horde at the hands of the Crimean Tatars – remnants of the 
Horde themselves - was not until 1502. Thus, bookmen dramatized this episode as a way of 
positioning themselves above and greater than the Horde; they had outlived the Mongol 
Empire. These attitudes only hardened through the course of the sixteenth century as Muscovy 
turned West and toward Lithuania. 
The greatest revision would not appear until after the annexation of the khanate of 
Kazan glorified in Kazanskaia istoriia which most historians agree came from the 1560s. Here 
for the first time the writers provided a retrospective analysis that described the battle as 
complete liberation from the Tatar Yoke. The writer states that “then in our Russian Land we 
were freed from the burden (yarmo) and submission (pokorenie) to the Muslim 
(busurmanskogo) and began to recover, as if from winter to clean spring.”201 The text, unlike 
those before it, acknowledges Tatar sovereignty. The text differs from previous narratives 
because it recognized “submission,” an end to suzerainty, and clearly elucidated the political 
relationship between Rus’ and Tatar. According to Halperin: “The author of this piece violated 
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the conceptual framework that Russian intellectuals had applied to Russo-Tatar relations for 
more than four hundred years.”202 No previous author had completely acknowledged Rus’ 
subservience until the Horde had crumbled and the Russian state was supremely powerful. The 
widespread belief in many Russian’s political imagination that the stand on the Ugra was the 
definitive moment in Russia’s liberation from the Tatars owes much to the author of the 
Kazanskaia isotoriia.  
Much rewriting of history took place in Moscow in the sixteenth century, but there was 
little apparent change in Russian perspectives on Russo-Tatar relations.203 Thus the reluctance 
of the bookmen during the Mongol period to confront the real nature of Russia’s political 
relationship with the Mongols carried into Muscovy. By the 1550s and 1560s, the major themes 
of the new Muscovite ideology depended on a vision of sustained and harmonious power of 
Orthodoxy and autocracy that had persisted from the Kievan times to the present. Thus, the 
Mongols had no place in this schema. As Halperin puts it, “For the ideologues of sixteenth-
century Muscovy to admit not only that the Mongols had conquered Russia, but that they had 
remained its masters for nearly two and a half centuries was simply out of the question.”204 
Thus, the reluctance of chroniclers to confront the nature of Russia’s political relationship with 
the Golden Horde carried into the tsardom of Muscovy.  
During this period, Ivan III united Northeastern Russian for good, the church became 
more autonomous, and according to the bookmen, the Russians conquered the infidel Horde 
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and it disintegrated. They wrote about each of these significant developments without 
acknowledging their subservient status. The bookmen’s accounts of the Mongols provide a 
glimpse of attitudes of resistance in Rus’. Thus, I believe that the Russian intellectual response 
to essentially ignore the Mongol conquest was an indication of neither hypocrisy nor weakness 
of national character, but a form of anti-Tatar resistance. The Russians were confronted with a 
reality, submission to overlords, that they could not possibly reconcile with the Orthodox 
religious foundations of their society. Their response to this ideological conundrum, a very 
human one, was to use their frame of reference to ignore it and later, after the Golden Horde 
collapsed, conveniently express strong anti-Mongol sentiments.  
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Conclusion 
In 1502 a small group of Crimean nomads officially conquered and succeeded the 
Golden Horde. In these last few years of the century in Rus’, the “formerly warring princedoms 
were bought up or conquered by Moscow and a fragile national unity imposed by Ivan’s 
autocratic rule. This amalgamation initiated the empire building that lasted unabated into the 
twentieth century” and beyond.205 With the Mongols conquered, the bookmen infused the 
emerging nation with the God-given mission to defend the civilized world against the infidel. As 
Donald Ostrowski interprets the evolving narratives of the Mongols and especially the Battle of 
1480, he argues that “churchmen developed an anti-Tatar ideology that soon came to 
permeate all their writings about the steppe and has heavily influence historians’ interpretation 
of this period.”206 Once the Golden Horde collapsed, by the mid-sixteenth century this attitude 
became explicitly anti-Tatar. By downgrading this important part of Russian history and ignoring 
the fact of conquest, negative attitudes toward the Golden Horde propped up Russian 
greatness. 
Moreover, one cannot help but appreciate the perceptual approach and the framework 
that determined how medieval writers, redactors, and scribes thought and wrote about the 
Mongols. They ravaged their towns in an incalculable cost of lives and property.207 However, 
the bookmen wrote about the two and a half centuries and described the physical violence in 
religious terms only. There are no racial epithets, no references to orientalism, and no 
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descriptions of the Mongols as primitive nomads until later. The Russians hated the Mongols 
because they were infidels and later Muslims. As Halperin understands it, “religious exclusivism 
was the motive behind the ‘ideology of silence’” in the historical record.208 Bookmen recorded 
incidents of aggression and raids but not trade and alliances. He also points to the fact that 
Kievan bookmen did this, but the significant part is that medieval Russian writers went further. 
They avoided the ideological problem of being subjected to infidels by effectively denying that 
it had occurred. After all, the chronicles are full of Tatar tax collectors and descriptions of trips 
to Sarai, but never address the true political status of Russia under the Horde or the issue of 
conquest. In the chronicles, the repeated verb is Pleniti that implies not repeated conquest, but 
simply plundering.209 The bookmen were aware of the conquest, but somehow, they never 
admitted that the khans were also rulers of Russia. 
After all, religious establishments have always traditionally created sacred justifications 
for the activities of the governments under which they operate. The Rus’ Orthodox Church was 
no exception to this general practice. As Ostrowski analyzes, any premodern ideology has 
social, political, and intellectual components.210 For Muscovy and the bookmen, the military 
and diplomatic struggles against their enemies, the Mongols, was the political component, and 
the creation of the “virtual” arch from Kiev to Moscow was the intellectual component that 
justified the existence of the present social and political hierarchies. The Kievan traditions the 
intellectual “virtual past” upheld such as the mode of succession and the seats of the grand 
princes combined with the strong central government adopted from the Mongols Thus, by the 
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mid-sixteenth century, the Orthodox Church and the bookmen developed views that fulfilled all 
three of Ostrowski’s criteria, political, intellectual, and social, and thus had a fully articulated 
pre-modern ideology.  
Furthermore, Hartog notes that “it would be a mistake, when considering the Mongol 
impact on Russia society, to accept on face value the medieval writer’s literary prose.”211 More 
importantly, the significance lies in what can be gleaned from them. Chronicle writings were 
meant for the upper class of society, and thus Russian aristocrats became more familiar with 
the Mongols than peasants. Mongol contact with the peasants, though very little, must have 
been quite unpleasant due to raids and heavy taxes. Much of the existing historiography points 
to the idea that they never lost sight of the eventual liberation. I argue that it is not exactly the 
case. As the writings of the bookmen evolved, by this time, their focus was not Orthodoxy or 
encouraging opposition to the Golden Horde, but propping up the political authority of the 
emerging Muscovite state.  After the Horde had crumbled, bookmen continued to infuse their 
writings with anti-Tatar messages to prop up the political authority of Muscovy. 
One must remember the Church’s position as both the caretaker of Russian spiritual and 
patriotic values and beneficiary of Tatar policies was extremely awkward.212 After all, the 
Church gave full backing to princes when they could such as in the battles of 1380 and 1480, 
but also benefitted mightily from the Mongols’ religious tolerance. This ecclesiastic support for 
Russian rebellion even while the Horde was powerful, shows that the Mongols didn’t teach 
them subservience. Furthermore, the Church found itself in the unusual position of trying to 
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modify and account for Mongol institutions and practices within a Byzantine-based frame of 
reference. Russian bookmen adjusted their worldview to fit political circumstances. As 
Ostrowski points out, “this hypothesis might help to explain why the sources provide such 
seemingly contradictory information and why historians provide opposing interpretations.”213 
During the initial phase of Mongol occupation bookmen wrote about conquest and 
invasion in religious terms of martyrdom and victimhood. After the initial occupation era, 
Russia and its bookmen were left to its own devices. Because the Mongols ruled from the 
steppe, the Russians were able to avoid confronting the ideological problem of their defeat 
which Halperin has labelled the “ideology of silence.” The Russian bookmen’s religious 
chronicles avoided mentioning that any substantive change in sovereignty had taken place. This 
allowed the bookmen and the princes to maintain a certain fiction that they were still 
independent. Scribes continued to copy and recopy the lives of saints and other events, but the 
church had other priorities: in the early dark decades of subjugation, it faced the immediate 
task of providing spiritual consolidation to a stricken and outraged population.214 Bookmen had 
never been called upon to rationalize conquest. They finessed this obstacle by presenting the 
period as a continuation of Kievan times with no change in suzerainty. Thus, the Russian 
bookmen threw a veil over the political implications of Mongol hegemony. Later, chroniclers 
adopted harsher stances of resistance and the preservation of a shared Russia language and 
history. After the Golden Horde crumbled in the early 1500s, strong anti-Tatar sentiments are 
found throughout the chronicles. As Muscovy grew, it made sense for scribes to support the 
                                                          
213 Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, 26.  
214 Kahn, Lipovetsky, Reyfman, and Sandler, A History of Russian Literature, 23-24.  
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tale of victory over the marauding nomads because it bolstered the political authority of the 
emerging state.  
From Kievan Rus’ through the Mongol conquest, the chronicles of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries addressed the vulnerability of boundaries, urging princes to keep their 
ritualized promises and join forces against invaders. Many local chronicles attest to a shared 
awareness of place and common interests among the Eastern Slavs, giving them a foundation 
for something like a proto-typical national identity.  While the tone seems dry, the selection of 
content and manipulation of sources was a way to convey viewpoint and adjust reputations of 
rulers and dynasties. In this way, the chronicles adopt tones and the worldview of the ruling 
house. These writings, during the time of occupation, reflected questions of how to secure the 
territory of the Orthodox Rus’ and rekindle the days of Kiev by animating stories of catastrophe 
and revival. The chronicles were narratives that tell the story of the rise of the Russian state as 
one of trauma with the potential for renewal. Secondly, like Halperin, I argue that the multitude 
of chronicle entries comes far closer to suggesting the nature of medieval Russian attitudes 
toward their conquerors than more modern interpretations of national liberation 
contemporary readers have imposed on the bookmen. Thus, the bookmen’s chronicles reflect 
the history of the times but also the bookmen’s projection of their own circumstances and 
creation of their own ideologies. 
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